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15 Sept 1972

CIA-Cuba-Bay of Pig
Kennedy, Robert

ASSASSINATION LEGACY

On April 15, 1972, WO predicted that "Teddy Kennedy would remain on the sidelines during the coming Presidential Election, regardless whether the Democratic Convention in Miami will want to draft him or not." WO continued: "Back in 1963 shortly after President Kennedy's assassination, Robert F. Kennedy, while he was still Attorney General, conducted his own investigation of the death of his brother. That private investigation, which ran parallel with the official inquiry into the magnicide conducted by the Warren Commission, was featured by trips to this country by an Inspector Hamilton, former Chief Inspector of Scotland Yard, Hamilton . . . had been retained by Bobby to help unravel the real truth about the murder of JFK. . . . Hamilton zeroed on the fact that the assassination of John Kennedy had occurred very shortly after his brother Bobby had made some preliminary moves of taking direct, personal control of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, whose leadership he blamed for the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Hamilton, following the *'cui prodest'* ('whom does it benefit?') reasoning, reached the conclusion that Bobby's move to seize control of the CIA had something to do with murder of his elder brother. . . . Teddy has become convinced of the correctness of Hamilton's conclusion, and, furthermore, considers it to have been further vindicated by Bobby's own death—which occurred within a matter of days after he threw his hat into the presidential ring and was on the way to putting himself in the position to take over the free-spending, powerful cloak-and-dagger agency."

When in the spring the Presidential campaigns of Muskie and Humphrey faltered, Teddy Kennedy weakened under pressure and permitted his cohorts to stealthily start his Presidential campaign, but was abruptly stopped by the attempted assassination of George Wallace. The Wallace assassination plot followed almost exactly the pattern of the Kennedy assassinations.

Teddy was scared. He told his courtiers to desist from all efforts to secure his presidential nomination, but to continue bluffing that he was potentially available in order that he could exercise more power at the National Convention.

Teddy wanted McGovern nominated because he was the weakest candidate, most likely to be defeated and thus leave the door wide open for Teddy in 1976. Teddy knew that both Soviet Russia and Israel are anxious to have Nixon re-elected and that any candidate who would seriously jeopardize Nixon's re-election is in mortal danger.

The Soviet KGB and the CIA both conduct schools for assassins and frequently complement each other, as in the instance of Che Guevara where the KGB set up the Argentine-born revolutionist for the CIA to ambush him.

WO on June 15, 1968, reporting on the Guevara assassination, stated: "the killing was done by agents of our own Central Intelligence Agency, sometimes called 'Murder Unlimited' . . . Guevara was 'fingered' for the CIA by the Soviet police (KGB)."

The equally murderous Israeli secret political police are also specialists in political homicide and frequently work in cooperation with CIA and KGB.

The public opinion polls have constantly indicated that Kennedy could defeat Nixon.

In the interim between now and 1976 Teddy intends to ingratiate himself with both Moscow and Tel Aviv, and be the anointed Communist-Zionist successor of Nixon in the White House.

Guevara, Che
CIA-Bolivia

CIA & Cuba-Bay of Pigs
Kennedy, Robert
CIA 2-01-1

KENNEDY NEMESIS Although officials at GOP Headquarters recently came out with the "information" that Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass) would at the last moment storm the Democrat Convention and grab the Presidential nomination, according to political insiders no such move is in the making. They cite the following fact, which has been kept secret for nine years, to back their certitude that Teddy will remain on the sidelines during the coming Presidential election, regardless of whether the Democrat Convention in Miami will want to draft him or not.

Back in 1963, shortly after President Kennedy's assassination, Robert F. Kennedy, while he was still Attorney-General, conducted his own investigation of the death of his brother. That private investigation, which ran parallel with the official inquiry into the magnicide conducted by the Warren Commission, was featured by trips to this country by an Inspector Hamilton, former Chief Inspector of Scotland Yard. Hamilton, an old friend of Joseph P. Kennedy, with whom he had many contacts during the latter's ambassadorship in London, had been retained by Bobby to help unravel the real truth about the murder of J.F.K.

After long conferring with the members of the Kennedy family and making a few discreet soundings with his own contacts, Hamilton zeroed on the fact that the assassination of John Kennedy had occurred very shortly after his brother Bobby had made some preliminary moves of taking direct, personal control of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, whose leadership he blamed for the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Hamilton, following the "*cui prodest*" ("whom does it benefit?") reasoning, reached the conclusion that Bobby's move to seize control of the C.I.A. had something to do with the murder of his elder brother.

After Bobby's own assassination in 1968, it is not known whether Teddy has the documentation Bobby had collected in his private investigation or whether it has been destroyed.

But apparently Teddy has become convinced of the correctness of Hamilton's conclusion, and furthermore, considers it to have been further vindicated by Bobby's own death—which occurred within a matter of days after he threw his hat into the presidential ring and was on the way to put himself again in the position to take over the free-spending, powerful cloak-and-dagger agency.

Teddy Kennedy receives an average of about ten death threats a week via anonymous phone calls and letters. Voice prints of the phone calls and copies of the letters are turned over to the U.S. Secret Service. None of the culprits have been apprehended. Incidentally, it has been decided that Kennedy does not need Secret Service protection since he is a "non-candidate." All the other announced presidential candidates have a Secret Service detail assigned for their protection during the campaign. Significantly, as previously reported in WO, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger exercises direct control over the CIA, FBI, Secret Service and all other security and intelligence agencies.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chris Pinna

— Rudi Wimmaker (DoD Historian) provided. He received it in mail with a Swiss postmark.

Pat Lang

5/10/72
(DATE)

FORM NO. 1 AUG 54 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)

P-Joesten, Joachim
Kennedy, Robert

April 1972

Murder Fraud

was murdered by the CIA - and why

ESTEN, author of "Oswald: Assassin
bout the JFK assassination

ssination of President John F. Kennedy
facts concerning the slaying of his
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has been tightly controlled from the
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y reveal the basic truth about the
bly available to researchers.

These truly illuminating documents are: (1) The previously secret autopsy report by Dr. Thomas T. Noguchi, chief medical examiner-coroner, County of Los Angeles, which proves (a) that the fatal bullet fragmented in the head of the Senator and that therefore the claim of the Los Angeles Police Department that this bullet had been "recovered from the victim's head and booked as evidence" was a deliberate lie; (b) that this bullet was fired from contact distance (one inch from Kennedy's ear), while Sirhan never got closer than three feet to the Senator; and (c) that the direction of this shot, which Dr. Noguchi describes as "right to left, slightly to front, upward," was totally incompatible with the shooting position of Sirhan.

And (2) The complete, 272-page official transcript of the Grand Jury Proceedings of June 7, 1968, in the Sirhan Case (No. A-233421) which reveals, among a host of other telltale details, (a) that all the eyewitnesses closest to Kennedy at the time of the shooting testified concordantly that Sirhan was at least three feet away from the Senator and in front of him, while the fatal bullet entered Kennedy's head behind the right ear; and (b) that the LAPD's ballistics expert, DeWayne A. Wolfer, deliberately and falsely created the impression that he had identified the fatal bullet as having come from Sirhan's gun, while all he had at his disposal was another, non-fatal bullet.

Here, then, is one conspiracy easy to prove because the fraud was so blatant and self-exposing; because the true facts have been officially established - and then ignored at Sirhan's trial - leaving no room for "speculation" charges; and finally because the coverup lacks the sham prestige of the Warren Report. If it can be proved - and even the blindest and most obdurate will have to yield to this cogent presentation of the evidence - that Robert Kennedy was the victim of a conspiracy, with another gunman shooting at him from behind while Sirhan gesticulated in front, then it becomes self-evident that the President also fell victim to a plot, for the two crimes are intimately linked. The killing of RFK would make no sense whatsoever except on the premise that the organizers of the Dallas coup d'état feared his ascent to the presidency which would have meant to them, inevitably, exposure and punishment.

The murder of Robert Kennedy was organized and executed by the same agency which was responsible for the Dallas coup d'état (camouflaged as the senseless deed of one L.H.Oswald) - the CIA. Both Sirhan and the real killer, Thane Eugene Cesar, were CIA agents, as is conclusively demonstrated in the present report.

"New Light on the Robert Kennedy Murder Fraud" is mimeographed, not printed, and available only in a limited edition. This report runs to about 18,000 words and it is priced at $ 20.00 a copy. Address all orders to the author as follows: Joachim Joesten, 7890 Gutenburg Uber Waldshut, West Germany, preferably by airmail. If necessary

WASHINGTON POST
22 JUN 1971

CIA 1.03 Braden, Tom
+ Bundy, William
McNamara, Robert
Kennedy, Robert
McNaughton, John T.
CIA 3.03 Vietnam, S.
Sociol. of New York Times

Tom Braden

An Odd Fact About the Viet 'Record'

FORMER Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara mused one evening last winter on an odd fact about the "record" he left behind him "in the files," as he said. The odd fact was that the two men who knew most about that record—one of them as chief among those compiling it, the other as personal confidante—were dead. The first was Assistant Secretary of Defense John T. McNaughton. The second was Robert Kennedy.

It was Robert Kennedy who encouraged McNamara to leave behind him an objective record of the decision-making process which led his country from a game of bluff against a lot of little men in black pajamas to a devastating and terrible war.

On two occasions, McNamara recalled McNaughton presented him with drafts of the records, and on two occasions McNamara sent them back for redrafting. The fault he found was that both drafts were too kind to Robert McNamara. He wanted to leave a record behind him—not a justification. This is like McNamara and it was like Kennedy, and by the early part of 1967 when the record was begun the two friends were having grave doubts about the feasibility as well as the morality of what we were doing in Vietnam.

That is why the record is so valuable—because it is honest, to the point of being self-defamatory. It is as though a man going bankrupt could set apart for a moment his terrible anxiety, and resolve that no matter what happened to him, he would take the time to search his memory and put down on paper the answer to the question, "How did it come about?"

That is also why it is wise to read the record with the knowledge that it was conceived and compiled by men who had become convinced that they had made errors not only in judgment but in morality. No record confined to action can ever show motives. But it can raise questions about motives and this one does.

Did the war planners actually conspire to deceive the American pepole, or did they find themselves deceiving the American People in order to deceive Hanoi?

Did President Johnson tell untruths to the American people in order to help win an election, or had he convinced himself that the contingency plans he had authorized would always be plans and never realities?

Was the talk of provocation which the record reveals actually put into effect at the Tonkin Gulf, or did Tonkin Gulf come as a not unpleasant surprise? The record suggests deception but proves only error.

Of error there is no doubt. It comes in small detail and in large design. How could anybody of William Bundy's intelligence write memoranda about bombing so bereft of intellectual quality as to suggest he had never heard of the Strategic Bombing Survey?

How could Gen. Maxwell Taylor and Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge see so clearly that there was no government to defend in South Vietnam and then proceed to suggest means of defeending it?

How could leaders who depend upon intelligence information ignore the CIA estimates that the course they were following was likely to be fruitless and in any event was unnecessary?

And how could leaders of the most powerful country in the world decide that their failure to frighten an insignificant government into surrender by a show of force called, not for reappraisal, but for more and more force until at last the alternative to reappraisal was obliteration and the danger of obliteration in return?

It is clear now that McNamara—like Kennedy—had convinced himself that the only way to salvage our honor, our strength, and indeed our national security from this dreadful adventure was to abandon it. By that time, it was too late, both for him and for the nation his record now instructs.

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WASHINGTON STAR

19 MAY 1971

Kennedy, Robert
P—Guthman, Edwin
Soc. 4.0.2 We Band of Brothers
CIA 4—Cuba—Bay of Pigs

A BOOK FOR TODAY

A Personal Account Of Robert Kennedy

By MIRIAM OTTENBERG

WE BAND OF BROTHERS. A Memoir of Robert F. Kennedy. By Edwin Guthman. Harper & Row. 330 Pages. $7.95.

Of all the books written so far about Robert Kennedy, this warmly personal account likely is to mean the most to those whose relationship with him spanned his public years.

Like the good newspaperman he is, Pulitzer Prize-winner Ed Guthman, now national editor of the Los Angeles Times, writes what he knew. And as the Justice Department's press officer in the Kennedy years, he was in a position to know a lot. But Guthman's relationship to Kennedy went far beyond the formal requirements of a director of public information, just as all of Kennedy's assistants willingly performed any job required of them.

That's why they followed him from the Senate Rackets Committee to the Justice Department and on to the office of senator from New York.

Guthman himself had been with him in his Ambassador Hotel room only a few minutes before Kennedy left to claim victory in the 1968 California primary and fell to an assassin's bullet. Guthman takes a favorite passage of the Kennedy brothers, Bob and John, to describe the men who faced mobs angered at various times by the Freedom Riders and the first blacks to enter the Universities of Alabama and Mississippi, men who skillfully went about cleaning up James Hoffa's Teamsters Union, men who made good Bob Kennedy's promise to get the Bay of Pigs prisoners home by Christmas.

These words, quoted by Guthman, are from Shakespeare's King Henry V in his remarks to his men before the Battle of Agincourt:

"We few, we happy few, we band of brothers.
For he today that sheds his blood with me
Shall be my brother. . . .
And gentlemen. . . . now a-bed
Shall think themselves accursed they were not here. . . ."

Guthman frankly admits that even after six years, I know that I cannot be objective about these men . . . And I suspect that the department had not seen their likes before."

He says he's not objective about Bob Kennedy either but he spent too much time with Kennedy who always turned his humor on himself to permit himself the luxury of becoming maudlin. Instead, he pictures the man those of us who covered the Justice Department in those years came to know — a shirt-sleeved driving force, a man of humor and compassion, impatient with small minds.

Guthman goes beyond that to picture "a man of unlimited courage and capacity who experienced life to the fullest, who grew with every experience and tirelessly sought new challenges."

The book details many of those experiences and challenges. It begins back in 1956 when Kennedy, a lawyer-investigator for the Senate Investigating Subcommittee, was beginning to investigate corrupt unions and Guthman, then a reporter on the Seattle Times, was investigating Dave Beck, then international president of the Teamsters Union.

It follows the Kennedys through the Democratic Convention when Sen. "Scoop" Jackson seemed likely to be tapped as vice president but Lyndon Johnson got the nod.

Commenting on what he called "rancorous relationship" between Johnson and Bob Kennedy, Guthman said "they mistrusted each other almost from the beginning and their mistrust turned to bitter enmity at the end."

The relationship with J. Edgar Hoover, as Guthman pictures it, was different. In the beginning, Guthman reported, Kennedy asked Hoover's advice on whether he should accept the post of attorney general and Hoover said he should. In the end, however, their relationship was strained, and hostile.

As Guthman reviews the trials and triumphs of Bob Kennedy, he reveals untold stories behind the headlines not only at the Justice Department but also at the White House for, as he points out, "Never before had a man so shared the burdens of the Presidency without actually holding the office."

He spares us the horror of the last night. Instead, he concludes: "Yet all he had accomplished was only a beginning, for to know anything about him is to know that had he lived and won in 1968, he would have been a great president; that had he lost, he would not have despaired or retreated but would have fought on as best he could."

THE WASHINGTON POST PARADE MAGAZINE
2 May 1971

p-Guthman, Edwin
soc.4.01.2 We Band of Brothers
Kennedy, Robert

AUTHOR EDWIN GUTHMAN (L) WITH THE LATE ROBERT KENNEDY.

BOBBY To the plethora of books on the late Robert Kennedy, assassinated in Los Angeles on June 5, 1968, the night of California's primary election, you may shortly add what is surely one of the best, memorable, poignant, and authoritative, We Band of Brothers, by Edwin Guthman, national editor of The Los Angeles Times, a Pulitzer Prize winner from Seattle, and Bobby's press secretary from 1961 to 1965.

The book, scheduled for publication May 19 by Harper & Row, derives its title from Shakespeare's Henry V St. Crispian's Day speech: "We few, we happy few, we band of brothers; for he today that sheds his blood with me, shall be my brother..."

This was one of the Shakespearean speeches both Jack and Bobby Kennedy took great relish in reciting. Bobby knew it in its entirety, and photos to the friends who fought with him in the Kennedy political wars bear many of its lines.

It was Robert Kennedy who brought Guthman to Washington after Guthman's brilliant investigative reporting, which exonerated a University of Washington professor falsely accused of attending a secret Communist training school in New York, won Guthman his Pulitzer in 1950.

THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS
19 Nov 1970

P-Sorensen, Theodore
P-Stein, Jean
P-Heren, Louis
P-Galbraith, John Kenneth
Soc.4.01.2 The Kennedy Legac
Y-No Hail, No Farew

The Kennedy Fantasy

The Kennedy Legacy
by Theodore Sorensen.
Macmillan, 414 pp., $6.95

American Journey: The Times of Robert Kennedy
Interviews by Jean Stein, edited by George Plimpton.
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 448 pp., $8.95

No Hail, No Farewell
by Louis Heren.
Harper & Row, 275 pp., $6.95

Who Needs the Democrats?
by John Kenneth Galbraith.
Doubleday, 86 pp., $4.95

Ronald Steel

The king and the crown prince are dead, and the heir apparent in disgrace. But the legend lives on, undiminished by promises unfulfilled, mistakes better forgotten, and doubts stilled by the cold hand of death. It is a tale with all the elements of a feudal chronicle—murders, usurped crowns, vendettas—and no shortage of troubadors to tell it. Theodore Sorensen, alter ego of John F. Kennedy and more recently a spurned aspirant to the public trust, now tells us, in words that will come as no surprise, that he views the Kennedy legacy "as the most important body of ideas in our time . . . a unique and priceless set of concepts . . . that endures and gives us hope."

We need not doubt Sorensen's sincerity—we all take hope where we can find it—to wonder what so great a faith rests upon. Whatever the Kennedy legacy may be, and we are told that it "can no more be summed up in a book than a Mozart concerto in a series of black notes," the Kennedy record was one of great expectations rather than inspiring accomplishments. But Sorensen has a weakness for the overexcited phrase, and his pseudo-Homeric prose ("let the word go forth . . . we shall pay any price, bear any burden . . . now the trumpet summons us again . . . ask not what your country can do for you . . .") both shaped and defined the posturing heroics of the Kennedy era.

We can sympathize with Sorensen's difficulty in defining the exact nature of the legacy he extols, although we are told that "to love each other like brothers . . . is the heart of the Kennedy legacy." Lest this hippie message seem sketchy, he also urges us to work hard, have faith in man's ability to change our society, and not lose hope. Not by accident is "hope" a recurring word, for if ever there was a politics of hope, it was that practiced by the Kennedys. Our hope that they had a remedy for the social ills they described so graphically, their hope that we would be patient while they figured out what to do. The legacy they left is the enduring hope that somehow things would have been better were they still here.

Sorensen embellishes the Kennedy legacy in sticky, though no doubt heartfelt, panegyrics ("there has never been in American public life a family like the Kennedys"), ladies' magazine commentary ("good taste and finesse governed not only their selection of clothes . . ."), political PR ("the . . . question asked everywhere was when the Kennedys would return to the White House"), and resentment at the usurper ("Lyndon Johnson . . . wanted to emulate their graceful wit and intellectual elegance"). The purpose of *The Kennedy Legacy* is to build a platform for what Sorensen calls a "peaceful revolution for the seventies."

The program, which appeared in time to publicize, but not noticeably assist, his effort to fill Robert Kennedy's old seat as senator from New York, is studded with such homilies as "we must pre-empt the extraordinary before the extremists seize it for their own . . . we must devise a new strategy for living instead of fighting . . . the United States must become the leading city of the world, not one of its largest villages." It is not surprising that the voters were not impressed by such summoning trumpets, for as John Kenneth Galbraith has pointed out in his pamphlet, *Who Needs the Democrats?*, "evasion, however disguised by rhetoric, moral purpose, or soaring phrase, comes over increasingly as crap."

As the brief reign of John F. Kennedy recedes into the historical past, leaving the Vietnam war as its permanent monument, and as Robert Kennedy's unending succession of agonizing reappraisals now seems little more than a footnote to the tribulations of Lyndon Johnson, it is sometimes hard to remember what the Kennedy legend is all about. But it does exist, as one is reminded in Arthur Schlesinger's description, in *A Thousand Days*, of JFK's inauguration when "the future everywhere seemed bright with hope . . . fresh winds were blowing. There was the excitement that comes from an injection of new men and new ideas." We now know that those fresh winds were blowing hot air, that a good many of those new ideas were tired clichés in vinyl wrappings, that some of those new men wrought disaster, and that their excitement came from a lust for power. But all that came later. At the time the passing of power from Eisenhower to Kennedy seemed to presage, from the poem that Robert Frost started to read at the inauguration but was unable to finish, "the glory of a next Augustan age."

The old sage knew what he was talking about. The era did turn out to be Augustan, at least in its pretenses ("... of a power leading from its strength and pride/ Of young ambition eager to be tried . . ."), but the glory was short-lived. It got tarnished somewhere around the Bay of Pigs and never recaptured its former glow. That fiasco was followed by the failure of summit diplomacy at Vienna, the manipulation of public anxiety over Berlin, a dramatic jump in the arms race, the unnecessary trip to the brink during the Cuban missile crisis, timidity on civil rights, legislative stalemate in Congress, and the decision to send the first American troops to Vietnam. Somehow everything went wrong, and increasingly the crusading knight gave way to the conventional politician who had no answers for us. John F. Kennedy's assassination came almost as a reprieve, forever enshrining him in history as the glamorous, heroic leader he wanted to be, rather than as the politician buffeted by events he could not control.

By the time Robert Kennedy emerged from his grief over the murder of his brother and began maneuvering

Soc.4.01.2 American Journey
Y-Who Needs the Dem crats

continued

Kennedy, John F.
Kennedy, Robert
On ig. under Steel

RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH
2 Oct 1970

CIA-0214-2
Kennedy, Robert F.
Soc.14.01.2 Thirteen Days

Cuba--1962 and 1970

It was during the early autumn days of September-October, 1962, that U. S. intelligence exposed the introduction by Russia of surface-to-surface nuclear missiles into Cuba and the administration of President John F. Kennedy prepared a course of action to have the weapons removed.

Eight years later, almost to the day, another direct Russian threat to U. S. security may be taking shape in the Caribbean. As in 1962, circumstances may have led the Russians to misunderstand the American mood. That may be the reason the Nixon Administration has chosen to warn the Soviets before irrefutable evidence of the Russians' intentions is in.

During 1962, the Kennedy Administration's Bay of Pigs fiasco was fresh in Russian memory as a sign of American timidity. Now, during the Nixon Administration, the Soviets may be interpreting America's withdrawal from Vietnam and the shrill anti-war protests here at home as open invitations to renew their attempts to introduce offensive weapons into the Western Hemisphere.

Of course the Russians pooh-pooh U. S. fears that a strategic submarine base is to be the end result of the activity at Cienfuegos on the southern coast of Castro's Cuba, but if the 1962 missile crisis teaches us anything it is to be skeptical of any Russian denials.

In his book, *Thirteen Days*, an account of the Cuban missile crisis, Robert F. Kennedy recounted numerous promises by top Soviet leaders that no offensive missiles had been or would be sent to Cuba. Some of the promises came even as American intelligence was confirming the rapid preparation of missile sites.

"Now, as the representatives of the CIA explained the U-2 photographs that morning, Tuesday, October 16, we realized that it had been lies, one gigantic fabric of lies," he wrote. "The Russians were putting missiles in Cuba, and they had been shipping them there and beginning the construction of the sites at the same time those various private and public assurances were being forwarded by Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy."

The understanding that emerged from the U.S. naval quarantine in 1962 was that all offensive weapons would be removed, and, in President Kennedy's words, "kept out of the Hemisphere in the future." Unless those conditions continue to be met, the possibility of U. S. military action against the nearby Red threat cannot be ruled out.

Americans cannot sanguinely accept the building of a base for missile-bearing submarines in Cuba, if that is what the Russians are up to, because it matters little to the the targets whether missiles are delivered from land or from a seaport base. The Russians would be miscalculating dreadfully, we believe, if they expect Richard Nixon to be any less alarmed over their machinations in Cuba than John Kennedy was, or the majority of American people to be less concerned about their security in 1970 than they were in 1962.

The New York Times Book Review
6 June 1969

T-King, Larry L.
P-Newfield, Jack
Kennedy, Robert
Soc. 4.01.2 Robert Kennedy A Memoir

The shadings, complexities, internal furies of the man

Robert Kennedy

A Memoir.
By Jack Newfield.
318 pp. New York:
E. P. Dutton & Co. $6.95.

By LARRY L. KING

As a charter member of Students for a Democratic Society in 1962, Jack Newfield originally saw only the Bad Bobby. When, as a journalist for The Village Voice, he encountered Robert Kennedy on a regular basis beginning in 1966, he was skeptical of his man. Mr. Newfield now can write that "Robert Kennedy was the one politician of his time who might have united the black and white poor into a new majority for change—and American liberalism hardly noticed." The author believes there is "a mistaken public image of Robert Kennedy created by the simplified and static reporting of the mass media," and says that if his book has "any precise purpose" it is to rectify that image.

Mr. Newfield's political and social passions, his obvious love for a friend who increasingly believed with him on basic questions—expressed in the "new journalism" of personal involvement—are literary assets, if political liabilities. Because he was not content to confine his recollections altogether to R. F. K.'s best moments, Mr. Newfield came at least within shouting distance of his goal.

One cannot read of the R. F. K. who procrastinated in agony before rejecting American policy in Vietnam and L. B. J. (because they both were, at least in part, creations of his brother), or of his anger at the operators of a miserable migrant labor camp or of his sadness when rejected by young campus liberals, without gaining a better understanding of the man often confused with his myth. Despite an absence of charity toward even mild opponents of R. F. K., and a churlishness sometimes bordering on the vicious where certain old anti-Kennedy antagonists are concerned, this is a perceptive and moving book.

The memoir is historically valuable too. Newfield was closer to the Senator than most writers; and presuming the accuracy of the author's reportage, we are given fascinating and helpful views of the private Kennedy. Newfield brings to Kennedy's personality those shadings, complexities and internal furies that would have made him a great character in fiction; the book humanizes R. F. K. in ways more real than the saccharine post-mortem mourning poured out by so many politicians, editorial writers and TV networks.

Mr. King, a contributing editor at Harper's, is the author of ". . . And Other Dirty Stories."

Here is R. F. K. grousing that he must sit through "a boring, three-hour sermon next to L. B. J., while keeping a solemn expression on his face," at Cardinal Spellman's funeral. (We are told R. F. K. didn't think much of Spellman anyway.) R. F. K. on Eugene McCarthy: "Gene just isn't a nice person. In 1964 he was pulling all sorts of strings trying to get the Vice-Presidential nomination. Hubert Humphrey had been his friend for twenty years, and he was trying to screw Hubert. At the same time, Bob McNamara twice turned down the Vice-Presidency because he felt I should get it. This is the difference between loyalty and egotism."

Senator Kennedy compared New York's organization Democrats to "a zoo"; he defended the C. I. A. as having "a very healthy view of Communism" compared with State and other departments; in September, 1967, he thought L. B. J. "might quit the night before the convention opens" because "he is a coward."

"So much of Kennedy demanded a literary imagination to be understood," writes Newfield of his "memoir as well as a biography." For exactly this reason the book may be judged more worthy in select nooks of the Russian Tea Room than in those Washington, Bronx, or Johnson City precincts populated by pragmatic old pols whose idea of a good book is one that will give you house odds.

Richard Daley and Lyndon Johnson could read this book aloud to each other, and half the time neither would know what in the name of Democracy Mr. Newfield is driving at. For instance, R. F. K. is spoken of as a practitioner of "sensual politics" ("He knew, on instinct, that he had to experience—see, smell, hear, touch—places like DeBadts' migrant camp, just as he sensed that he had to experience physically Delano, and Wolfe County, and Bedford-Stuyvesant, and all those Indian reservations . . ."); and he is described as "being always in a state of becoming" ("He defined and created himself by action, and learned almost everything from experience. His end was always unknown. He dared death repeatedly . . ."), or he is seen browsing through Camus to ease his pain at some ghetto shame or human degradation.

Not everyone in the posh watering places of New York's midnight intelligentsia will quickly applaud Jack Newfield either. He has probably hurt some of their feelings. He quotes (with evident approval) the late Senator's contempt for those "lazy, sick, New York liberals" who spend their "time worrying about not being invited to the important parties, or seeing psychiatrists," and he slips in a little reverse snobbery in noting that he and most "leftish writers" in R. F. K.'s camp "had working-class backgrounds."

He is little more tolerant of Senator Eugene McCarthy and his followers than he is of L. B. J.'s Texas-Humphrey-Daley crowd, or of "the shabby clubhouse operators" in New York with whom his idol sometimes found it necessary to do the kind of partisan, behind-the-door business better left to mere mortals.

Holding Mr. Newfield to the highest literary standards, he must be faulted for making the villains who opposed R. F. K.'s search for the Presidency evil beyond the devil's dream, while endowing the Good Guys with near-monopoly on virtue. One must question his contention that had Kennedy lived he would have been nominated for President at Chicago in 1968. On this point, Newfield supplies much of the evidence against himself: R. F. K. was "a strident Jeremiah at a time when white America longed to hear a soothing Pollyanna"; both L. B. J. and McCarthy despised him; he wasn't trusted by the old-line pols who eventually nominated Hubert Humphrey.

It seems logical to assume that had Senator Kennedy lived he and his supporters might have suffered in Chicago those abuses ultimately reserved for the McCarthyites. Surely the venomous old snakes who sank their fangs into Senator McCarthy in their frantic efforts to preserve their private lairs would have reserved equal poisons for a living, non-martyred Robert Kennedy, threatening him with the same basic losses. This, sadly, is a moot question. ■

5

The Government Employees Exchange
16 April 1969

Otepka, Otto
C.I.A.-1.03 Bundy, W.
C.I.A.-4-Cuba (Bay of Pigs)
Kennedy, Robert
C.I.A.-1.01 Helms, Richard
P. Bancroft, Harding

Otepka Was Major Roadlock In Takeover By A "New Team"

New York Times Linked To CIA Plot On Offl.

The Central Intelligence Agency's "New Team," including such "outsiders" as Harding A. Bancroft, now the Executive Vice President of *The New York Times*, played a critical role in the final decision of Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy to press Secretary of State Dean Rusk to proceed with the dismissal of Otto F. Otepka as the State Department's top Security Evaluator, a former Ambassador associated with CIA Director Richard Helms informed this newspaper on April 11.

According to the source, Mr. Bancroft played a role because of his liaison and coordinating work involving the use of the organization and facilities of *The New York Times* on behalf of the CIA and the "New Team."

Other persons who had a role included William H. Brubeck who had been the recipient of the 1960 "leak" of Top Secret information from the State Department to the campaign headquarters of John Kennedy which contributed significantly to Mr. Kennedy's narrow victory at the election polls. After Mr. Kennedy's victory, Mr. Brubeck received complete information about Mr. Otepka's role in tracing this "leak", the former Ambassador revealed.

Other members of the "New Team" were McGeorge Bundy and his brother William Bundy, who had moved from the Central Intelligence Agency to become the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, including Vietnam.

"The New Team"

The "New Team" at the Central Intelligence Agency was being planned by Attorney General Robert Kennedy even before the Bay of Pigs "fiasco" in 1961. In fact, the former Ambassador said, the Attorney General had a special group of his own "monitoring" the Bay of Pigs operation to determine which persons, not yet projected for the "New Team", would "pass the test".

Although the "Bay of Pigs" was a national disaster, the source said, Robert Kennedy exploited it within the Government to accelerate building the "New Team."

Kennedy, Robert
Sec. 4.01 3 Thirteen Days
C.I.A. 1.01
McCone, John
C.I.A. 3.03
Cuba
Orig. under Steel

Endgame

Thirteen Days
by Robert F. Kennedy, with Introductions by Harold Macmillan and Robert S. McNamara
Norton, 224 pp., $5.95

Ronald Steel

It was a time, in Khrushchev's memorable phrase, "when the smell of burning hung in the air." Robert Kennedy's account of those thirteen days in 1962 from October 16, when he and his brother were presented with proof that the Russians were secretly building long-range missile bases in Cuba, until October 28, when the Kremlin agreed to dismantle them—shows the view from the inside by one of the key participants. Written with economy and directness, *Thirteen Days* is a valuable historical document with all the elements of a thriller.

This short, terse memoir—bloated by the publisher with superfluous introductions, photographs, and documents—does not, of course, tell the whole story of the missile crisis. There is a good deal about the events leading up to the crisis that is gone over too lightly or deliberately clouded over. The clash of personalities and ambivalent motives is muted and the tone rather detached. But behind the measured prose we see the spectacle of rational minds swayed by passions and the euphoria of power, governmental machinery breaking down into the struggle of individual wills, and decisions affecting the future of humanity made by a handful of men—the best of whom were not always sure they were right. A disturbing description of decision-making in the nuclear age, this posthumous work also offers a revealing glimpse of an enigmatic man who might have bridged the gap between the old politics and the new.

We have come to take the balance of terror so much for granted that it is hard to imagine any situation in which the two super-powers would actually use their terrible weapons. Yet more than once during those thirteen days it seemed as though the unthinkable might actually occur. SAC bombers were dispersed to airfields throughout the country and roamed the skies with their nuclear cargoes. At one point President Kennedy, fearful that some trigger-happy colonel might set off the spark, ordered all atomic missiles defused so that the order to fire would have to come directly from the White House.

The first showdown came on the morning of October 24, as Soviet ships approached the 500-mile quarantine line drawn around Cuba. "I felt," Robert Kennedy wrote of those terrible moments, "we were on the edge of a precipice with no way off.... President Kennedy had initiated the course of events, but he no longer had control over them." Faced with this blockade, the Russian ships turned back, and the first crisis was surmounted. No more missiles could get into Cuba. But what of the ones already there that Russian technicians were installing with feverish haste? President Kennedy was determined that they had to be removed immediately, and on Saturday, October 27, sent his brother to tell Soviet ambassador Dobrynin "that if they did not remove those bases, we would remove them." The Pentagon prepared for an air strike against the bases and an invasion of Cuba. "The expectation," Robert Kennedy wrote of that fateful Saturday, "was a military confrontation by Tuesday."

We know, of course, how it turned out. On Sunday morning the message came through that Khrushchev would withdraw the missiles in return for a US pledge not to invade Cuba. Kennedy had pulled off the greatest coup of his career—the first, and one hopes the last, military victory of the nuclear era. Not a shot was fired, although we came a good deal closer to war than most people realized at the time, or have cared to think about since.

It was a victory not only over the Soviets, but over many of Kennedy's own advisers who favored a more militant course from the start. The drama was played out among a hastily assembled group, which later took on the formal title of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, that met several times a day in the White House. The sessions were frequently stormy, although the lines were loosely drawn at first. Several of the participants, according to Robert Kennedy, shifted their opinion "from one extreme to the other—supporting an air attack at the beginning of the meeting and, by the time we left the White House, supporting no action at all." A few, such as Dean Acheson and Douglas Dillon, were hawks from the start, and argued for what they euphemistically called a "surgical strike" against the air bases. They were eventually joined by John McCone, General Maxwell Taylor, Paul Nitze, and McGeorge Bundy. Favoring a more moderate course, which settled around a naval blockade to be "escalated" to an attack on the bases only if absolutely necessary, were the doves; led by Robert Kennedy and Robert McNamara, and including George Ball, Roswell Gilpatric, Llewellyn Thompson, and Robert Lovett.

Dean Rusk, for the most part, avoided taking a stand, or even attending the sessions. The Secretary of State, in Robert Kennedy's caustic words, "had other duties during this period and frequently could not attend our meetings." It would be interesting to know what these duties were. Robert Kennedy does not elaborate, although he does offer the further intriguing aside, that "Secretary Rusk missed President Kennedy's extremely important meeting with Prime Minister Macmillan in Nassau because of a diplomatic dinner he felt he should attend." That was the meeting, one will remember, where President Kennedy agreed to help out Harold Macmillan (author of one of the two Introductions to this volume) on the eve of the British elections by turning over Polaris missiles to Britain after the Skybolt fiasco that had embarrassed the Tories. De Gaulle, predictably, was furious, declared that Britain still valued her trans-Atlantic ties above her European ones, and vetoed her entry into the Common Market. The Nassau accord was a colossal error of judgment that an astute Secretary of State should have been able to prevent—had he not been too busy attending diplomatic dinners.

Some of the hawks were, of course, predictable. It is not surprising that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were eager to use their expensive hardware. "They seemed always ready to assume," Robert Kennedy wrote, "that a war was in our national interest. One of the Joint Chiefs of Staff once said to me he believed in a preventive attack against the Soviet Union." Nor is it surprising that Dean Acheson, among the most recalcitrant of the cold warriors, should have come down on the side of the military. "I felt we were too eager to liquidate this thing," Elie Abel reports him as saying in *The Missile Crisis*. "So long as we had the thumbscrew on Khrushchev, we should have given it another turn every day. We were too eager to make an agreement with the Russians. They had no business there in the first place." Ever since his crucifixion by Congress during the Alger Hiss affair, Acheson has become increasingly reactionary and eager to prove his toughness toward the Communists. His bomb-first-and-talk-later argument found receptive ears in such pillars of the Eastern

Continued

The Washington Post Book World
19 January 1969

Kenneth
-SOC 4.01-2 Thirteen Days

Storm over Havana: Who were the real heroes?

THIRTEEN DAYS: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis. By Robert F. Kennedy. Illustrated. Norton. 224 pp. $5.50.

By John Kenneth Galbraith

Orig. under Galbraith
Kennedy, Robert F.

On Saturday, October 20, 1962, I had just arrived in London to give a lecture and, such things not being possible in New Delhi, had gone to see a Peter Ustinov play. When I came out, the papers had big black headlines about a Chinese invasion of India and I made a suitable mental note that another political ambassador had been caught absent from his post at the moment of need. I wasn't especially surprised when, about three o'clock in the morning, the duty officer of the London Embassy awoke me with a message conveying the same thought in rather sardonic terms from President Kennedy and asking that I return forthwith to India. That I did. On arriving, I learned that it was the Russians in Cuba, not the Chinese in the Himalayas, that had induced the President's message. He wanted me to persuade Nehru to react sympathetically and use his influence accordingly.

John Kenneth Galbraith, professor of economics at Harvard, and author of The New Industrial State, *was U. S. Ambassador to India at the time of the Cuban missile crisis.*

Though I did so, there could have been few Americans, in or out of office, who were less involved in the crisis of the days following than I. The Chinese were making great progress in the mountains. Someone had to worry about an infinity of questions ranging from the military reaction of the Indians, to the foreign policy of Bhutan, to how to keep under wraps our own crusaders (fortunately not numerous), who saw in India's involvement with China an exciting new breakthrough in the Cold War. Additionally, our communications system was monopolized by the Cuban crisis as was the attention of everyone in Washington. I knew only what the headlines told until long after the fact.

When I had time to worry, it was, as always, about the peculiar dynamics of the Washington crisis meeting. This has the truly terrible tendency always to favor the most reckless position, for this is the position that requires the least moral courage. The man who says: "Let's move in with all we have and to hell with the consequences" will get applause and he knows it. He seems personally brave and also thinks he is. In fact, he is a coward who fears that in urging a more deliberate policy, he will invite the disapprobation of his colleagues or will later be accused of advocating a policy of weakness. Normally, also, he is aided by his inability to foresee, or even to imagine, the consequences of the action he advocates. In contrast, the man who calls for caution, a close assessment of consequences, an effort to understand the opposing point of view, especially if Communist, and who proposes concessions must have great courage. He is a real hero and rare.

I would have worried more in 1962 had I then known with what classical precision these tendencies were working themselves out in Washington. We know now from this fascinating memorandum. The generals, with the major exception of Maxwell Taylor (who later and sadly succumbed to the advocates of sanguinary action on Vietnam and so blotted the end of a well-regarded career), were all for the easy heroics. So was one group of civilians who, like the generals, yearned to be known as men of hard-boiled, masculine decision. They urged not air raids on the missile sites but, for purposes of scholarly gloss, a "surgical strike." There can, in history, have been few more appalling examples of the self-deluding power of words. Those concerned knew about air power, or should have. They knew, accordingly, that there was no way of bombing the missile sites without attacking all of the surrounding acreage and missing, very likely, some of the missiles. The medical counterpart of a surgical air strike would be an operation by a surgeon with cataracts wearing skiing mittens who, in moving to excise a lung cancer, was fairly likely to make his first incision into the large intestine.

On the other side were the men with enough moral courage to consider consequences — Robert Kennedy, Robert McNamara, George Ball, Adlai Stevenson and, before all, the President himself. As one now reads this memorandum, it is almost impossible to imagine anyone being on the other side — and those who were must now have a certain problem in explaining it to themselves. In particular, it was Adlai Stevenson who was willing to trade some obsolete nuclear weapons in Turkey (which the President had already twice ordered removed) for similar action by the Russians in Cuba. (It has since been said on ample authority that the President would have removed these missiles if that had been necessary for a peaceful bargain. And they were taken out almost immediately after the missile crisis.)

The most chilling thing about this memorandum is the reflection it prompts on what would have happened if the men of moral courage had not been present — or if a President's disposition was not to uphold but overrule them. And it is disconcerting to consider how the political position of an Administration, one more moderate than its Republican opposition, was juxtaposed to the survival of the country, even of mankind. I do not know what insanity caused the Soviets to send the missiles to Cuba — and after showing commendable caution about the deployment of this gadgetry in far less dangerous locations. But once they were there, the political needs of the Kennedy Administration urged it to take almost any risk to get them out. Temporizing would have been politically disastrous. Yet national safety called for a very deliberate policy — for temporizing. In the full light of time, it doubtless called for a more cautious policy than the one that Kennedy pursued. Again we see how frayed and perilous are the threads on which existence depends.

Robert Kennedy, perhaps it is needless to say, wrote this memorandum himself and it is done with economy of style and no slight narrative power. With all his other talent, he was a very good writer. This makes it all very sad that the publisher, no doubt in order to

Continued

3

p-Witcover, Jules
Kennedy, Robert

Soc.4.01.2
85 Days, the Last Campaign of Robert Kennedy

Donald Stanley on Books

A Sanctification of RFK

"He did not really look that much like the late President Kennedy when you thought about it — shorter, thinner, less handsome, a bigger and more prominent nose, much toothier, less confident in manner, more casual in dress. But still it was there, born not simply of family resemblance but of that past pain, of television images etched in remembrance . . ."

That was Robert Kennedy, says Jules Witcover, and all of us would agree. That was Bobby when he announced his candidacy last March, his brother's brother, many felt, who wanted to be President simply because that's what Kennedys did — and because he wanted to "get even" with Lyndon Johnson for being there when his brother fell.

But when he died in Los Angeles 85 days later, Robert Kennedy was his own man "to a degree few appreciated." so says Witcover, a journalist who stayed with Kennedy during his last campaign and who, in "85 Days," has left a startlingly good record of that event and that transformation of a man.

★ ★ ★

WITCOVER SAYS Kennedy, for once and at the crucial time, misread the political signs. This was in 1967 when, as a critic of Johnson's Vietnam policy, he nonetheless felt it impossible to oppose an incumbent for the nation's highest office. Thus he publicly supported LBJ's candidacy in 1968, hoping thereby to remove the onus of The Feud from his Vietnam attacks.

And thus Gene McCarthy seized the youthful anti-war activists by his candidacy — a segment of the nation whose loss Kennedy felt deeply, partly because he HAD preceded McCarthy in outspoken criticism of the war.

Witcover details the search, led by New York's Allard Lowenstein, for a candidate to take on Johnson. Before he found McCarthy, Lowenstein tried James Gavin, John Kenneth Galbraith and John McGovern.

Earliest of all, he had sounded out Kennedy who, said Lowenstein later, "took it as seriously as the idea of a priest in Bogota deposing the Pope."

★ ★ ★

BUT, WITCOVER SAYS, Kennedy was prepared to go before the New Hampshire upset proved Johnson vulnerable. A meeting on March 5, a week before the primary vote, in Ted Kennedy's office was "not about the why and why not of it, but the when and how."

Old Kennedy allies were divided on the advisability. The issue was not whether RFK could win. Nobody, at the time, thought he could. It was whether the cause (anti-Vietnam) was worth losing for. Ted Sorenson, for one, thought it wasn't.

Ken O'Donnell thought it was and told Kennedy, "If you want to run because of the issue, I'm with you. If you just want to get the White House limousines back, I'm against it."

Witcover has some inside news that is fascinating:

- Kennedy tried to talk Walter Cronkite into running for his New York Senate seat.
- The plane RFK sent to return Martin Luther King's body from Memphis to Atlanta (and which McCarthyites said was "politics") was requested by Mrs. King.
- There is more on the ill-fated Presidential Vietnam Commission, a Sorenson idea that LBJ almost bought and which would have kept Kennedy out of the 1968 campaign.

But Witcover's greatest effort (and for me his most successful) is in purging the record of Robert Kennedy's alleged "ruthlessness" and in substituting the picture of a politician of extraordinary compassion and sensitivity.

"He identified with people who hurt," said Fred Dutton after Kennedy's death. "Maybe it was because he hurt."

85 DAYS, THE LAST CAMPAIGN OF ROBERT KENNEDY. By Jules Witcover. Putnam; 338 pages; $6.95.

3

GAZETTE

E - 94,543
NOV 12 1968

Kennedy, Robert F.
C.I.A. 3.03 Cuba
p - Chew, Peter T.

The Cuban Crisis Reinterpreted

Readers of the late Robert Kennedy's version of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis came away with an impression of John F. Kennedy as a cool, strong President who used tough diplomacy to win an important victory over the Soviets.

But an article in The National Observer by Peter T. Chew puts a much different light on the incident. Chew quotes two recent books to rebut one of Robert Kennedy's main assertions, and concludes that the Cuban crisis was more a defeat for the United States than for the Soviet Union.

Robert Kennedy states flatly, "On Tuesday morning, Oct. 16, 1962, shortly after 9 o'clock, President Kennedy . . . told me that a U2 had just finished a photographic mission and that the intelligence community had become convinced that Russia was placing missiles and atomic weapons in Cuba . . . The dominant feeling at the meeting was stunned surprise. No one had expected or anticipated that the Russians would deploy surface-to-surface missiles in Cuba . . . No official within the government had ever suggested to President Kennedy that the Russian buildup in Cuba would include missiles."

But both Arthur Krock's recent "Memoirs" and Mario Lazo's "Dagger in the Heart" state explicitly that John McCone, head of the CIA, had told Kennedy as early as Aug. 10 that missiles were being installed in Cuba, and he repeated the warning several times in the weeks following.

It was during those months that former Sens. Kenneth Keating and Homer Capehart were charging that the Soviets were bringing offensive missiles into Cuba. The Kennedy administration repeatedly replied that the only weapons were "defensive."

If Krock and Lazo are right, Robert Kennedy's recollection was wrong. If the evidence of Soviet offensive missiles was clear as early as Aug. 10, the President could not have been stunned and surprised on Oct. 16. Yet the administration failed to act until then. Why?

The answer to that question is not known. Lazo thinks that it was because the Kennedy brothers were lulled by repeated Soviet assurances. That, however, is only conjecture.

Also conjecture is Lazo's charge that President Kennedy was a weak and vacillating man under fire, and that Khruschev tried to take advantage of him.

Another point of debate concerns the concessions that Khrushchev extracted from Kennedy in return for pulling out the missiles. At the time, Kennedy gave the impression that none had been given, but Lazo says that Kennedy agreed (1) not to invade Cuba and (2) to remove our Thor and Jupiter missile bases from Turkey and Italy.

Whatever the final historical verdict on the incident may be, it seems plain that we do not have all the facts now.

What is a fact is that Castro still controls Cuba and uses it as a base to spread Communist subversion throughout Latin America.